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SECTION 13(d) OF THE '34 ACT: THE INFERENCE OF
A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR A STOCK ISSUER
The inference of private causes of action under federal statutes has
been a continuing source of litigation and legal comment.1 Since 1975 the
Supreme Court has taken an increasingly restrictive attitude toward inferring private causes of action2 and most recently, has illustrated this
strict view in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington3 and TransamericaMortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis.4 Accordingly, in light of the standards set
forth in Redington and Transamerica, courts are re-examining prior
decisions that inferred private causes of action under various federal
laws.' Recently, two district courts declined to infer a private cause of
action by a stock issuer for injunctive relief under section 13(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act)." Several other federal courts,
however, have recently inferred such a private cause of action under section 13(d).7 The disagreement among the federal courts reflects the in-

' See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-20 (1979)
(inferring private cause of action for contract recission and injunctive relief under Investment Advisor's Act of 1940 ('40 Act) § 215, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976), but not for damages
under § 206 of '40 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976)); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 579 (1979) (refusing inference of private cause of action under § 17(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1976); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (inferred private cause of action under § 901(a) of Title IX of Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976); N.E. Underwood, Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Definitionof an Implied Right
of Action, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 533 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Underwood]; Comment, Implied Rights of Action in Federal Legislation:"Harmonization Within the Statutory
Scheme, 1980 DUKE L.J. 928 [hereinafter cited as Implied Rights]; Note, The Federal
Securities Acts: the Demise of the Implied PrivateRights Doctrine?,1980 U. ILL. L.F. 627
[hereinafter cited as Federal Securities Acts].
I See text accompanying notes 28-40 and 66-76 infra.
3 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979) (refusing private cause of action under § 17(a) of '34 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1976)).
4.444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (inferring private cause of action for contract recission and injunctive relief under § 215 of '40 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80-15 (1976), but not for damages under §
206 of '40 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976)).
See text accompanying notes 74-76 infra.
See Gateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. 495. F. Supp. 92, 96-100 (N.D.
Ill. 1980); Sta-Rite Indus., Inc. v. Nortek, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 358, 362-63 (E.D. Wis. 1980); text
accompanying notes 93-114 and 133-39 infra.
See Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1224 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
49 U.S.L.W. 3488 (1981); Saunders Leasing System, Inc. v. Societe Holding Gray D'Albion,
SA [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,881 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 30, 1981); Kirsch Co. v. Bliss &
Laughlin Indus., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 488, 492 (W.D. Mich. 1980); text accompanying notes
77-92 and 140-49 infra. See also Deneau v. Amtel, Inc., [1980] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,645, 98,459 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (court denied motion for summary judgment because of present confusion surrounding inference of private cause of action under § 13(d)); Frome, Buying and Selling Securities, 184 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1980) (present state of confusion over inference of
private cause of action for stock issuer under § 13(d)).
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herent conflict between the judicial desire to implement the legislative
purpose underlying a statute, and the judicial desire to refrain from
legislating through judicial decisions.' In the case of section 13(d) the conflict is particularly acute because the statute cannot be fully enforced
without either the inference of a private cause of action or a further
statutory enactment creating a private remedy.'
Section 13(d) of the '34 Act 0 and accompanying regulations" require
that any person holding more than five percent 2 of the stock of any corporation must file copies of a Schedule 13D11 with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the stock issuer within ten days after
such acquisition." Section 13(d) is a provision of the Williams Act, 5 which
Congress adopted to provide for full disclosure in connection with cash
tender offers"0 and other techniques for accumulating large blocks of
stock of publicly held corporations.' Congress did not enact section 13(d)
to regulate tender offers, but rather to provide notice to the investment
community of potential shifts in corporate control. 8
' See text accompanying notes 166-73 infra.
' See text accompanying notes 174-92 infra.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 to 102 (1980).
IS See generally GAF v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 910 (1972); Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 108-12 (7th Cir. 1970); Fogelson, Wenig
& Friedman, Changing the Takeover Game: The Securities and Exchange Commission's
Proposed Amendments to the Williams Act, 17 HARV. L. LEGIs. 409, 413-16 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Fogelson].
"315 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(A)-(E) (1976 & Supp. III 1979); see 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1980)
(Schedule 13D filing requirements and form).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
"SAct of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 454, amending 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a to kk (1976).
" See generally Brown, Changes in Offeror Strategy in Response to New Laws and
Regulations,28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 843 (1978); Fleischer & Mundheim, CorporateAcquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Fleischer & Mundheim]. Congress adopted §§ 14(d), (e) and (f) to regulate cash tender offers. See H.R. REP.
No. 1711, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811,
2819-21 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1711 and paginated to [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2811] (legislative history of §§ 14(d), (e) & (f); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d), (e) & (f) (1976)).
"TSee H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 16, at 2811. Congress considered the disclosure
required under the Williams Act essential for shareholders to make intelligent investment
decisions. Id. at 2813. See generally Comment, The Williams Amendments: An Evaluation
of the Early Returns, 23 VAND. L. REV. 700 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Williams Amendment]; Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and CorporatePurchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAW.
149 (1966); Manne, Cash Tender Offers For Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967
DUKE L.J. 231; Swanson, S.510 and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers: Distinguishing
St. George From the Dragon, 5 HARV. J. LEIS. 431 (1968).
11H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 16, at 2818. Congress designed the § 13(d) notice of
potential shifts in corporate control to allow the stock market to adjust evaluations of a corporation's worth. Id. at 2813; see text accompanying note 21 & note 121 infra. See generally
Comment, Private Right of Action for Damages Under Section 13(d, 32 STAN. L. REV. 581
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Private Rights]; Comment, Section 13(d) and Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 853 (1971).
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Congress did not expressly provide for private enforcement of section 13(d).' 9 Until recently, however, most federal courts have allowed a
stock issuer to seek injunctive relief against a stockholder who either
allegedly failed to file the required information or who filed a Schedule
13D containing alleged misrepresentations or misleading omissions."0
Courts based the inference of a private cause of action under section
13(d) on an interpretation of section 13(d) creating an obligation to file a
complete and truthful Schedule 13D." Courts therefore reasoned that in
order to force the purchaser to comply with the section 13(d) requirements, a stock issuer had standing under the section to seek an injunction following the filing of an inadequate or false Schedule 13D."

" See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 62 (1975). The Supreme Court has
never directly addressed the issue of an inferred private cause of action under § 13(d). The
Court, however, apparently assumed the existence of such an action for injunctive relief in
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975). The Court expressly recognized that
the plaintiff was asserting an inferred private cause of action and noted that the defendant
did not challenge Mosinee's standing to bring the action. Id. at 162; see text accompanying
note 4 supra.See generally Porter & Hyland, Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Company and the
Williams Act Injunction, 58 MARQ. L. REv 741 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Porter & Hyland];
Note, Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corporation and Implied Private Rights of Action, 28
HASTINGS L.J. 93 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Rights of Action].
2' See, e.g., General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90,94 n.5 (1st Cir. 1977); GAF
Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 720 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); W.A.
Krueger Co. v. Kirkpa.rick, Pettis, Smith, Polian, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 800, 803 (D. Neb. 1979);
Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.N.J. 1974). In addition to inferring a private
cause of action for stock issuers seeking injunctive relief under § 13(d), courts have inferred
an action by stockholders. See, e.g., Myers v. American Leisure Time Enterpr., Inc. 402 F.
Supp. 213, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd mem., 538 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976); Scott v. Multi-Amp
Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.N.J. 1974); Grow Chem. Corp. v. Uran, 316 F. Supp. 891, 892
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). Contra Gateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92,
100 (N.D. Ill. 1980). Most courts, however, have limited damage actions for violations of §
13(d) to suits brought by shareholders under § 18(a) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
See Berman v. Metzger, 593 SEC. REG. & LAW REP. (BNA) A-6, A-6 to A-7 (D.C. Feb. 2,
1981); Issen v. GSC Enterpr., Inc., 592 SEc. REG. & LAW REP. (BNA) A-8, A-10 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
26, 1981); Gateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92, 95 n.7 (N.D. Ill.
1980); Myers v. American Leisure Time Enterpr., Inc., 402 F. Supp. 213, 214-15 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd mem., 538 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976). Contra General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556
F.2d 90, 97 & n.12 (1st Cir. 1977); Grow Chem. Corp. v. Uran, 316 F. Supp. 891, 892 (S.D.N.Y.
1970). See generally Robinson & Mahoney, Schedule 13D: Wild Card in the Takeover Deck,
27 Bus. LAW 1107, 1128-35 (1972); Private Rights, supra note 18.
2 See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709,720 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910
(1972). The Milstein court stated that Congress intended § 13(d) to alert investors to potential changes in the control of a corporation. Id. Section 13(d) notice allows investors and
potential investors to properly evaluate the company. A Schedule 13D which is false or
misleading, therefore, subverts the purpose of § 13(d). Id.; see text accompanying notes
16-18 supra; note 121 infra.
' See General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 94 n.5 (1st Cir. 1977); GAF
Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 719-21 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); W.A.
Krueger Co. v. Kirkpatrick, Pettis, Smith, Polian, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 800, 803 (D. Neb. 1979).
Milstein was the first case to hold expressly that a stock issuer could seek injunctive relief
under section 13(d). See 453 F.2d at 720. See also Note, FederalSecurities Regulation-Section 131d), 17 VILL. L. REv. 734 (1972) (discussion of Milstein). Two federal courts, prior to
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In 1964 the Supreme Court in J.. Case & Co. v. Borak' provided the
basic foundation for the decisions inferring a private cause of action
under section 13(d).2" In Borak, the Supreme Court inferred a private
cause of action under section 14(a) of the '34 Act. 5 The Court's inquiry into whether section 14(a) gave rise to a private cause of action focused on
the adequacy of existing liability provisions to implement the congressional purpose." The Court emphasized that the federal courts had a
duty to provide remedies which would fulfill Congress' purpose in enacting a particular statute.'
Since 1975, however, the Supreme Court's decisions concerning the
inference of private causes of action under federal statutes have taken a
more restrictive approach.28 The Court's analysis has emphasized determining whether Congress intended to grant a private cause of action to
persons in the particular circumstances of a plaintiff.' In Cort v.
Milstein, assumed the existence of a private cause of action for stock issuers under

§

13(d),

without directly addressing the issue. See Bath Indus., Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97, 111 (7th Cir.
1970); Ozark Airlines, Inc. v. Cox, 326 F. Supp. 1113, 1114-15 (E.D. Mo. 1964).
377 U.S. 426 (1964).
" See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 719-21 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
910 (1972). The court in Milstein relied on Borak for the proposition that courts have a duty
to provide remedies necessary to implement Congress' purpose in adopting a statute. Id.
Additionally, the Milstein court relied on Borak for the conclusion that private enforcement
of § 13(d) provides a necessary supplement to SEC action. Id. at 721; see text accompanying
notes 25-27 infra.
" 377 U.S. at 430-31; see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) (§ 14(a) of '34 Act). The Supreme
Court in Borak limited the inferred private cause of action under § 14(a) to a stockholder's
action for injunctive relief or damages. 377 U.S. at 428, 431. The stockholder could bring the
action either derivatively or directly. Id. See also Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33,
39 (1916) (first Supreme Court case inferring private cause of action under federal statute;
injured railroad worker could bring action against employer under Federal Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 11-15 (1976)). See generally Morrison, Rights Without Remedies:
The Burger Court Takes the Federal Courts Out of the Business of Protecting Federal
Rights, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 841 (1977); Mowe, FederalStatutes and Implied Private Actions, 55 ORE. L. REv. 3 (1976); Note, Implying Civil Remedies for Federal Regulatory
Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285 (1963).
2 377 U.S. at 433; see, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1967)
(inferring private cause of action under § 51 of Voting Rights Act of 1965); Wyandotte
Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 200-24 (1967) (criminal sanction not exclusive
remedy under § 15 of Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899); see also Implied Rights, supra note
1, at 930; Note, Implication of PrivateActions from FederalStatutes: From Borak to Ash,
1976 J. CORP. L. 371, 371 [hereinafter cited as Implication of Private Actions].
" 377 U.S. at 432.
28 See Implied Rights, supra note 1, at 932-35.
26 See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453, 457-58 (1974). In National R.R. Passenger Corp. the Court employed a restrictive
statutory construction principle which states that when legislation expressly provides a
particular remedy or remedies, a court should not infer other remedies. Id. at 458. The
Court stated, however, that the presumption that Congress did not intend an additional inferred remedy, would yield to "clear contrary evidence of legislative intent." Id.; see Implication of Private Actions, supra note 26, at 380-81.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have consistently ignored the previous emphasis on
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Ash3" the Supreme Court established a four-pronged test to determine
whether Congress intended to grant a private cause of action under a
federal statute." The first factor of the Cort test is whether the plaintiff
is among the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted. 2
Secondly, a court is to examine legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create or deny a private remedy. The third factor involves the
consistency of a private remedy with the legislative purpose of the
statute. Finally, a court is to discern whether the area is one tradition-

the existence of an adequate statutory remedy for injured plaintiffs. See Implied Rights,
supra note 1, at 933; Federal Securities Acts, supra note 1, at 633-35. See also Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 47 (1977) (no inferred cause of action for defeated tender
offeror under § 14(c) of '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1976) or rule 10b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6
(1980)); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 68-70 (1975) (no inferred private cause of action for corporate stockholder under Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970)
(repealed 1976)); Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 425 (1975) (no
inferred private cause of action for brokerage house customers under Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78ggg(b) (1976)).
422 U.S. 66, 68-70 (1975) (no inferred private cause of action for corporate
shareholders under Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970) (repealed
1976)).
11 422 U.S. at 78. See generally Crawford & Schneider, The Implied Private Cause of
Action and the FederalAviation Act. A PracticalApplication of Cort v. Ash, 23 VILL. L.
REv. 657 (1977-1978); Implication of Private Actions, supra note 26, at 382-94. The Supreme
Court has only occasionally employed the full four-pronged test set forth in Cort v. Ash. See
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688-89 (1979) (employed complete Cort test).
But see Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (did not use
full Cort test); see text accompanying notes 66-73 infra.
" 422 U.S. at 78. The Court in Cort phrased the first factor alternatively as whether
the statute creates a federal right in favor of the plaintiff. Id. To discern whether the plaintiff in Cort was a special beneficiary of § 610 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA), the Court relied primarily on the language of § 610, while also examining the section's legislative history and purpose. 422 U.S. at 80-82. The Court characterized § 610 as a
criminal statute designed to benefit the public at large. Id. at 78-80. The Court stated that,
although a statute was enacted for the protection of the public rather than a specific group
of people, the Court still might infer a private cause of action. Id. at 79; see Wyandotte
Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201-02 (1967); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
431-32 (1964); Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 40 (1916). The Court in a subsequent case stated that the statutory language creating a right or duty was generally the
most accurate indicator of the propriety of inferring a private cause of action. Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979); see text accompanying notes 72-73 infra.
1 422 U.S. at 78. The Court in Cort examined the legislative history of the FECA to
determine the existence of legislative intent to deny or allow a private cause of action. Id. at
82-84. The Court also considered the statutory provisions for enforcement of the FECA. Id.
at 82 n.14; see note 29 supra.
1 422 U.S. at 78. The Court in Cort equated the third factor with the Court's prior
statement that courts have a duty to provide remedies necessary to implement the congressional purpose underlying a statute. Id. at 84; see text accompanying notes 26-27 supra. In
subsequent decisions the Supreme Court framed the third Cort factor as whether an inferred private cause of action is necessary to implement congressional purpose. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979).
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ally relegated to state law.' 5 The Supreme Court, however, did not indicate in Cort what weight, if any, each of the four enumerated factors carried."6
The recent Supreme Court decisions in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington3 and TransamericaMortgageAdvisors, Inc. v. Lewis38 reiterated the
restrictive approach to the inference of private causes of action under
federal statutes.3 9 Furthermore, these cases modified the four-pronged
analysis provided in Cort.40 In Redington, the plaintiff brought suit
against Touche Ross & Co. (Touche Ross), an independent certified
public accounting firm, for violations of section 17(a) of the '34 Act."
Under section 17(a) brokerage firms must file certified financial reports
with the SEC.42 Section 17(a) does not, however, expressly make accountants liable for certifying a financial statement containing false or
misleading statements." The Supreme Court held that section 17(a) did
not give rise to a private cause of action for damages."
1 422 U.S. at 78. The Court stated in Cort that if the cause of action in question is
primarily the concern of the states, inference of a cause of action under a federal law is inappropriate. Id. To evaluate the fourth factor in Cort, the Supreme Court examined whether
state law provided a remedy for the plaintiff's allegations. Id. at 64-65.
1 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979); see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
at 78-85; text accompanying notes 66-73 infra.
v 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
444 U.S. 11 (1979).
See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979). See generally Underwood, supra note 1,
at 541-48; Federal Securities Acts, supra note 1, at 638-48. Just prior to Redington and
Transamerica, the Supreme Court decided two other cases involving the inference of
private causes of action under federal statutes. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (inferred private cause of action under § 901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976)); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
285 (1979) (no inferred private cause of action under § 1905 of the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)). See generally FederalSecurities Acts, supra note 1, at
635-38. See also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 230 (1979) (inferred private cause of action
for damages under Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V). However,
neither Chrysler nor Cannon are as illustrative of the Supreme Court's increasingly strict
view of inferred private causes of action as Redington and Transamerica.Moreover, neither
Cannon nor Chrysler provide significant guidance for the application of the four-pronged
Cort test. In Cannon, the Court employed all four Cort factors, and stated that there was no
need to weigh the factors because all indicated positive congressional intent. 441 U.S. at
709. The Court applied the Cort test in Chrysler, but the discussion of an inferred private
cause of action was brief. See 441 U.S. at 280-81. In Chrysler, the Court did not discuss
whether the cause of action was one traditionally relegated to state law, the fourth Cort factor. See id. at 281. Arguably, discussion of the fourth factor was unnecessary in Chrysler
because the FOIA concerns only federal agency information. See id. at 285.
40 See text accompanying notes 65-76 infra.
442 U.S. at 565; see 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
,z442 U.S. at 563-64 n.3.
's

Id. at 566-65.

Id. at 567. The district court in Redington held that § 17(a) did not give rise to a
private cause of action and therefore dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. Id. at 566. A divided panel of the Second Circuit in Redington reversed the district court and concluded that §
17(a) did give rise to a private cause of action. Id. at 566-67.
'
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Examining the language of section 17(a), the Court found that the
section did not confer rights in favor of any particular class. 5 Rather, the
Court concluded that section 17(a) was simply a bookkeeping provision
designed to prevent insolvencies, and not a provision to remedy the consequences of an insolvency.46 Therefore, the Court did not find an
especially benefitted class under section 17(a).47 The Court also noted the
absence of legislative history relating to a private remedy.48 The
statutory enforcement scheme of the '34 Act lends additional support to
the Court's denial of an inferred cause of action under section 17(a).49 The
'34 Act provides for private enforcement of section 17(a) under section
18(a) of the '34 Act. 0 Consequently the Court found that Congress did
not intend the existence of an inferred private action under section
17(a).51 The Redington Court did not consider the last two Cort factors
and therefore did not examine the necessity of inferring a private cause
of action to implement the purpose of section 17(a) or whether the cause
of action is one traditionally relegated to state law.2 Having determined
from the first two Cort factors that Congress did not intend section 17(a)
to give rise to a private action, the Court stated that the inquiry had
ended.' In Redington, the Court therefore concluded that there was no
need to examine the remaining two Cort factors.5
In Transamerica, a shareholder of a real estate investment trust
brought a derivative suit on behalf of the trust and a class action on
behalf of the trust's shareholders, for violations of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 ('40 Act). Named defendants were the trust's trustees
'5

Id. at 569.

"Id. at 570-71.
'
"

See text accompanying note 32 supra.
442 U.S. at 571. Because the language of § 17(a) weighed against the inference of a

private remedy, the Court in Redington found that the silence of the legislative history as
to private enforcement of § 17(a) supported the Court's refusal to infer a private cause of ac-

tion. Id. at 571-72.
49Id.
I' Id. at 572-74. Section 18(a) of the '34 Act provides a private cause of action for purchasers or sellers of securities who relied on materially misleading statements contained in
a filing required under the '34 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). A plaintiff who brings an action
under § 18(a), directs the action against the person who made, or caused to be made, the
misleading statements. Id. The Court in Redington concluded, therefore, that an accountant
who made and certified a financial statement containing false or misleading statements
could be held liable under § 18(a). 442 U.S. at 572. The '34 Act also provides for private enforcement of sections other than § 17(a). Id. at 571-72; see § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976); §
9(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976); § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1976) (provisions of '34 Act providing express private remedies). The Court in Redington stated that the express private remedies
in other '34 Act provisions indicate that Congress will provide a private remedy when such

a remedy is desired. 442 U.S. at 572.
, 442 U.S. at 574.
5 See id. at 575-76.
Id. at 576.
5Id.

1 444 U.S. at 13-15; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 21 (1976). See generally Note, Private
Causes of Action UnderSection 206 of the Investment Advisors Act, 74 MICH. L. REV. 308,
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and investment advisors. 6 The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and
monetary damages. 7 The Supreme Court inferred a limited private
remedy under section 215 of the '40 Act. 8 The Court examined two sections of the '40 Act, section 215 and section 206.1' Initially, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs, as clients of investment advisors were within
the group especially benefitted by sections 215 and 206.0 Because section 215 provides that contracts in violation of the section are void, the
Court concluded that Congress must have intended the customary legal
consequences of a void contract, including recission and injunction."
However, in examining section 206, which prohibits fraudulent practices
by investment advisors, the Court did not find a congressional intent to
create a private cause of action.2 The legislative history of the '40 Act
was silent as to a private cause of action under section 206,3 and furthermore, the '40 Act provides express remedies for the enforcement of section 206.4 As in Redington, the Court in Transamericarefused to consider the remaining Cort factors, and therefore did not examine whether
a private remedy was necessary to implement the purpose of section 206
or whether the private cause of action was traditionally relegated to
state law.6"
In both Redington and Transamericathe Court stated that statutory
construction governs whether a statute gives rise to an inferred cause of
308-12 (1975); Comment, the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 1 VAND. L. REv. 68 (1947).
The plaintiffs in Transamericaalleged that the defendants were guilty of various frauds and
breaches of fiduciary duty in the management of the real estate trust, 444 U.S. at 13-15.
444 U.S. at 13.
17 Id.
at 14. The plaintiffs in Transamericasought to enjoin further performance of the
advisory contract and to rescind the contract. Id. The plaintiff also sought restitution of fees
and other considerations paid by the trust to defendants, an accounting of illegal profits,
and an award of damages. Id.
I Id. at 24. The district court in Transamericaconcluded that the '40 Act conferred no
private cause of action and therefore dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. Id. at 14. The Court
of Appeals in Transamericareversed, holding that the '40 Act contained a private cause of
action for injunctive relief and damages. Id.
" Id. at 16; see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976) (voiding any contract whose formation or performance would violate '40 Act); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976) ('40 Act prohibiting fraudulent
practices by investment advisors).
'o 444 U.S. at 17-18.
" Id.
at 18-19. The Court in Transamericafound that the language of § 215 implied a
private cause of action for recission and injunctive relief. Id. at 18. Therefore, in connection
with § 215, the Court did not examine the statutory enforcement scheme of the '40 Act to
discern further evidence of congressional intent concerning a private cause of action. See id.
at 18-19.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19-20; see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1976) (criminal prosecution of '40 Act violations);
15 U.S.C. § 90b-9 (1976) (SEC injunctive action to force compliance with '40 Act); 15 U.S.C. §
80b-3 (1976) (administrative sanctions against violators of '40 Act).
11 444 U.S. at 23-24, see text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
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action. 6 Further, the Court held that the principles of statutory construction should be used to determine the existence of a congressional
intent either to create or deny a private cause of action under a particular statute."7 The Court's statutory construction analysis emphasizes the
statute's language, legislative history and purpose, and enforcement
scheme. 8 Courts traditionally employ these considerations to determine
legislative intent. 9 Consequently, the remaining Cort factors of whether
an inferred private cause of action is necessary to implement congressional purpose and whether such a cause of action is one traditionally
relegated to state law, do not carry the same weight as the initial two
Cort factors. If analysis under the first two Cort factors reveals a congressional intent to -deny an inferred private cause of action, Redington
and Transamericaindicate that the remaining Cort factors become irrelevant.7 ' Indeed, Transamericasuggests that even if the language of the
statute creates an especially benefitted class which includes the plaintiff, examination of the third and fourth Cort factors is not necessary if a
court does not find congressional intent to create a private cause of acTransamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979). In Redington the Court rejected the plaintiff's
tort based arguments for the inference of a private cause of action. Id. at 568. The Court
stated that even when someone violates a federal statute and harm results to an individual,
the injured party does not automatically have a private cause of action under the violated
statute. Id.; see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979).
" Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
" See text accompanying notes 45-54 and 60-65 supra.
" See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979). The Court in
Redington stated that as with any case involving statutory interpretation, a case concerning the inference of a private cause of action should begin with the analysis of the statute's
language. Id. at 568. In Transamerica,the Court stated that when a statute expressly provides for a particular remedy or remedies, courts should be reluctant to read other
remedies into the statutory scheme. 444 U.S. at 19.
"0 See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576-77 (1979).
71 See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979). The Supreme Court did not
state in either Redington or Transamericawhen or if a court may properly consider the last
two Cort factors of whether an inferred private remedy is necessary to implement a
statute's purpose and whether such an action is traditionally relegated to state law. Because
neither Redington nor Transamericaoverturned Cort, the last two Cort factors are still
relevant consideration. See Private Rights, supra note 18, at 590. But see Gateway Indus.,
Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92, 96-97 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (Supreme Court in
Redington and Transamericarejected consideration of last two Cort factors). If a court
discerns persuasive congressional intent to create a private remedy through examining the
statute's language, legislative history and purpose, and enforcement provisions, further
analysis under the remaining Cort factors may be unnecessary. However, if a court's examination of the first two Cort factors reveals less than persuasive or ambiguous congressional intent, then further analysis under the remaining Cort test might be appropriate to
clarify the ambiguity.
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tion.72 Together, Redington and Transamericaindicate that a statute's
language, legislative history and purpose, and enforcement scheme are
the most reliable indicators of congressional intent. 3
Redington and Transamericareflect the Supreme Court's increasingly
strict view of inferred private causes of action. The Court will infer a
private remedy under a federal statute only with persuasive evidence of
congressional intent to create such an action. The Supreme Court's view
necessarily affects the validity of earlier lower court decisions inferring
a private cause of action under section 13(d).74 Courts therefore should
reconsider the existence of a particular cause of action according to the
analysis set forth in Redington and Transamerica.However, many lower
courts considering the inference of a private cause of action under section 13(d) of the '34 Act have either assumed the existence of such an action,75 or have simply accepted earlier judicial decisions which held that
76
the action existed.
72

See 444 U.S. at 24; text accompanying note 32 supra. The TransamericaCourt, rely-

ing on Redington, stated that even when a statute was designed to protect especially
designated persons, the Court would not automatically infer a private cause of action on
their behalf. Id. at 24; see Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979). The
TransamericaCourt's reliance on Redington is unsound, however, because the Redington
Court found that the statute in question did not create an especially benefitted class containing the plaintiff. Id. at 570-71; see text accompanying notes 45-47 supra. Moreover, with
the exception of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978), in which the statute
indicated a special policy against judicial interference, the Supreme Court until Transamerica had never refused to infer a cause of action where the statute created an especially
benefitted class to which the plaintiff belongs. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 690 n.13.
" See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979).
7' The Supreme Court in both Redington and Transamerica severely limited the
precedential value of J.I. Case & Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), the case which provided
the foundation for lower court decisions inferring a private cause of action under § 13(d).
See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576-78 (1979); text accompanying notes 23-29 supra. In
Redington, the plaintiffs argued that the Supreme Court's analysis in Borak required an inferred private cause of action under § 17(a) of the '40 Act. 442 U.S. at 576-77. The Redington
Court rejected the plaintiffs' contentions and stated that although the Court did not question the actual holding in Borak, the Court refused to read the Borak opinion to require that
virtually every provision of the securities acts gives rise to an inferred private cause of action. Id. at 577. The Redington Court explained the difference between the analysis in
Borak and that in Redington by stating that the Court now followed a more strict standard
for the inference of a private cause of action than in Borak. Id. at 578.
The Court in Transamericadismissed the analysis employed in Borak. See 444 U.S. at
15-16. The TransamericaCourt, citing Borak, stated that although some prior opinions had
emphasized the desirability of inferring a private cause of action, that a court should base a
decision on whether Congress actually intended to create the private remedy. Id. at 15.
11E.g., Chromally Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 601 F.2d 240, 248 (8th Cir. 1979);
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388, 396-97 (8th Cir. 1976);
Stromfield v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 484 F. Supp. 1264, 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
" E.g., General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 94 n.5 (1st Cir. 1977); Wellman
v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); W.A. Krueger Co. v. Kirkpatrick, Pettis,
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Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex, LtdY is one of the recent federal court
decisions inferring a private cause of action for a stock issuer for injunctive relief under section 13(d). 7' The plaintiff corporation sought to enjoin
defendants from purchasing additional shares of the corporation's
stock.79 The complaint alleged omissions and misleading statements in
the defendant's Schedule 13D, which was filed after the initial stock purchases." The district court initially granted a temporary restraining
order pending further clarification of defendant's Schedule 13D. 1
Following amendment of defendant's Schedule 13D, the district court
dismissed plaintiff's action on jurisdictional grounds.82 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiff, as a stock issuer, could seek injunctive relief under section 13(d) for alleged omissions or misleading
statements in a filing." Defendants did not question the existence of a
private cause of action under section 13(d), but did challenge plaintiff's
standing as a stock issuer to seek injunctive relief under the section. 4
Smith, Polian, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 800, 803 (D. Neb. 1979); Meyers v. American Leisure Time
Enterpr., Ltd., 402 F. Supp. 213, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd mem., 538 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976);
Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.N.J. 1974).
624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3488 (1981).
71 Id. at 1224; see text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
624 F.2d at 1219. The plaintiff in Dan River sought not only injunctive relief, but
also declaratory relief and other equitable remedies. Id.
Id. Mannip, a subsidiary of the Dan River defendants and also a defendant, filed a
Schedule 13D. Id. The plaintiff alleged that defendants should have either joined the Mannip filing or filed their own Schedule 13D. Id.
" Id. at 1219-20. In DanRiver, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction and applied for a temporary restraining order pending a hearing on the motion for an injunction.
Id. at 1219. The district court held that Dan River had a right to additional disclosure and
therefore restrained the defendants from acquiring additional stock until after filing a new
or amended Schedule 13D. Id. The district court specified the additional information that
defendants were to include in their amended Schedule 13D. Id. at 1219-20.
1 Id. at 1217-18. The defendants in Dan River filed a new Schedule 13D and at the
same time moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
at 1220. The plaintiff then filed an amended complaint charging omissions, inconsistencies,
and contradictions in the amended Schedule 13D. Id. at 1220-21. The district court dismissed
the plaintiff's complaint following the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction. Id.
at 1221. The district court assumed that a stock issuer could bring an action to force a
shareholder to file a Schedule 13D which on its face meets the requirements of § 13(d). Id.
However, once a Schedule 13D was filed which on its face was accurate, the stock issuer had
no right to question the truthfulness or completeness of the schedule. Id.
Id. at 1224.
Id. at 1222. In Dan River the district court relied on two Supreme Court cases,
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) and Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430
U.S. 1 (1977), to support the proposition that stock issuers did not have standing under §
13(d). 624 F.2d at 1222. The Fourth Circuit distinguished both Supreme Court cases. Id. In
Piperthe Supreme Court denied a private cause of action for damages by a defeated tender
offeror under § 14(e) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1976). 430 U.S. at 47. Although the
Supreme Court in Piper demonstrated a more restrictive approach to the inference of
private causes of action than in earlier cases, the Fourth Circuit in Dan River did not
discuss the analysis employed by the Supreme Court in Piper.See 624 F.2d at 1222; text accompanying note 28 supra.See generally FederalSecurities Acts, supra note 1, at 634; The
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The defendants contended that section 13(d) was enacted for the sole
benefit of stockholders and therefore a stock issuer was not within the
class especially benefitted by section 13(d).85
The Dan River court did not consider the Supreme Court decisions
in Redington and Transamerica, nor did the court apply the fourpronged test provided in Cort. Rather, the Fourth Circuit relied on prior
lower court decisions allowing a stock issuer to seek injunctive relief
under section 13(d).16 These decisions were founded on the reasoning
employed by the Supreme Court in J.L Case & Co. v. Borak 7 Even the
more recent lower court decisions on which the Fourth Cirucit relied
failed to consider Supreme Court cases subsequent to Borak which inSupreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 274 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Term].
Rather the Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's statement in Piper that the target
corporation's standing to sue under § 14(e) was not an issue in the case. 624 F.2d at 1222; see
430 U.S. at 42 n.28 & 47 n.33. The Dan River court reasoned, therefore, that Piper was not
contrary authority to the right of a stock issuer to seek injunctive relief under § 13(d). 624
F.2d at 1222.
Rondeau involved a stock issuer's suit for injunctive relief under § 13(d). 422 U.S. at 50.
The issue in Rondeau was not the stock issuer's standing to bring an action under § 13(d), or
the inference of a private cause of action under § 13(d), but whether a showing of irreparable
harm was necessary to receive injunctive relief under the section. 422 U.S. at 50; see note 19
supra. See generally Porter & Hyland, supra note 19; Rights of Action, supra note 19; note
19 supra. In Dan River the court emphasized that the Supreme Court in Rondeau specifically noted that the decision had no bearing on whether a corporation could obtain a decree
enjoining a shareholder who had violated § 13(d). 624 F.2d at 1222; see 422 U.S. at 59 n.9.
The Fourth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's comment in Rondeau as a positive suggestion that a stock issuer does have standing under § 13(d) to seek injunctive relief, rather
than as a neutral position on the inference of a private cause of action under § 13(d). 624 F.2d
at 1222 n.5; see Rights of Action, supra note 19, at 112-14 (suggesting inferred cause of action under § 13(d) for stock issuer in Rondeau discussion). But see Gateway Indus., Inc. v.
Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92, 95 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Sta-Rite Indus., Inc. v.
Nortek, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 358, 360 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (Supreme Court in Rondeau did not address issue of inferred cause of action under § 13(d)).
1 624 F.2d at 1222. The defendants in Dan River inferred that a stock issuer would use
a private cause of action under § 13(d) as armament for management in resisting takeovers
or large accumulations of their corporation's stock. Id.; see note 105 infra.
" 624 F.2d at 1222-24; see Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240, 248
(8th Cir. 1979); General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 94 n.5 (1st Cir. 1977); GAF
Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 720 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); text accompanying notes 20-22 & 75-76 supra. Because the district court in Dan River concluded
that § 13(d) only required a filing that was accurate on its face, the Fourth Circuit focused
on the judicial interpretation of § 13(d) which requires the filing of a complete and truthful
Schedule 13D. 424 F.2d at 1222-24; see Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d
at 248; SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cerL denied, 440 U.S.
913 (1979); General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d at 97; GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453
F.2d 709, 720 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); text accompanying notes 20-22
supra. The Court in Dan River held, therefore, that if a stock issuer could establish that a
defendant had filed an inaccurate, incomplete or misleading Schedule 13D, a court should
grant the appropriate injunctive relief and require the filing of a truthful and complete
schedule. 624 F.2d at 1224.
1 See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
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dicate a restrictive attitude toward inferred private causes of action."
By relying on prior lower court decisions allowing a stock issuer to seek
injunctive relief under section 13(d), the Fourth Circuit focused on the
necessity of such an action to implement the purpose of section 13(d). 9
This consideration alone, however, is insufficient support for the inference of a private cause of action. Under the Supreme Court's
analysis a court must determine whether Congress intended to create a
private cause of action by examining the statute's language, legislative
history and purpose, and enforcement provisions." The Fourth Circuit
failed to examine congressional intent through applying the analysis set
forth in Redington and Transamericaand, therefore, the holding in Dan
River, like the prior decision on which the Fourth Circuit relied, is
suspect. 2
In Gateway Industries, Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc.,93 a district
court reached a result contrary to Dan River. 4 The plaintiff sought injunctive relief as a result of defendant's alleged failure to comply with
the requirements of section 13(d).9 5 The defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that section 13(d) did not give rise to an inferred private right of action for a stock issuer. The court agreed with the
defendant and dismissed plaintiff's complaints for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. The Gateway court concluded that
the Supreme Court's strict approach toward inferred causes of action
rendered prior cases inferring a private cause of action for stock issuers
under section 13(d) less than compelling. 8 Therefore, the court analyzed
section 13(d) in conjunction with Redington and Transamericato determine whether Congress intended the inference of a private cause of action for stock issuers."
'3

See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
See text accompanying notes 21-22 & 26-27 supra;text accompanying notes 178-85

infra.
See text accompanying note 71 supra.
, See text accompanying notes 68-73 supra.
9 See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
1980).
'3 495 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ill.
" See id. at 95.
Id. at 93-94. The complaint in Gateway alleged that Agency Rent-A-Car's Schedule
13D was incomplete and contained misrepresentations. Id. at 94. The plaintiff sought to
force the defendant to sell all acquired shares of Gateway and to enjoin the defendant from
acquiring additional shares of Gateway stock. Id. at 94 n.3. Additionally, the plaintiff sought
to enjoin the defendant from voting any shares of Gateway stock or from exercising any influence on the management of Gateway. Id.
Id. at 94.
97Id.
11Id. at 96. The court in Gateway reasoned that prior cases relying on J.I. Case & Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), to infer a private cause of action under § 13(d) were no longer
persuasive because the Supreme Court had abandoned the Borak approach to inferring
causes of action. Id.; see text accompanying notes 28-37 & 66-74 supra.
" 495 F. Supp. at 97-99. The court in Gateway not only concluded that stock issuers
did not have standing to seek relief under § 13(d), but also concluded that § 13(d) did not give
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The Gateway court examined section 13(d)'s language, legislative
history and purpose, and the enforcement scheme of the '34 Act to ascertain the congressional intent concerning the existence of a private cause
of action under section 13(d)."°' An examination of section 13(d)'s
language and legislative history led the district court to conclude that
stock issuers are not among the class especially benefitted by section
13(d). 0' The court held that Congress enacted section 13(d) for the benefit
of shareholders only.' The Gateway court noted that the stated purpose
of section 13(d) is "protection of investors""' 3 and that the legislative
history suggests that Congress enacted section 13(d) for the protection
4
of only investors.""
Additionally, the district court relied on legislative
history stating that Congress designed the Williams Act to avoid tipping
the balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of
the person making the takeover bid.'0 5 Moreover, the Gateway court conrise to a private cause of action for a shareholder. Id. at 100-01; see note 20 supra. Consequently, the Gateway court foreclosed the ability of a stock issuer to bring an action under §
13(d) for the benefit of the corporation's shareholders. See 495 F. Supp. at 100-01.
495 F. Supp. at 97.
Id. at 98-99.
Id. The Gateway court found support for the conclusion that Congress enacted §
13(d) for the protection of investors only in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc. 430 U.S. 1 (1976).
495 F. Supp. at 98-99. In Piper,the Supreme Court, while questioning whether § 14(e) of the
'34 Act gave rise to a private cause of action, concluded that the legislative history of the
Williams Act indicated that Congress adopted the amendments to the '34 Act solely for the
protection of investors. 430 U.S. at 35. At least one commentator has criticized the Supreme
Court's conclusion in Piper that Congress adopted the Williams Act for the protection of
only investors. See 1976 Term, supra note 83, at 281-82. The commentator contended that
because the interests of shareholders and management are so closely aligned in takeover
situations and the Williams Act operates to the benefit of both, the Supreme Court cannot
single out shareholders as the specially benefitted class of the Williams Act. Id.; see notes
105 & 187 infra.
1o3Id. at 98; 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
104495 F. Supp. at 98-99; see text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
105495 F. Supp. at 98; see H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 16, at 2811, 2813. The court in
Gateway emphasized that the early drafts of the Williams Act reflected hostility to attempted takeovers and therefore, some members of Congress thought the bill benefitted the
stock issuer over the tender offeror. 495 F. Supp. at 98; see, e.g., 113 CONG. REC. 857-58
(1978) (comments of Senator Kuchel); Williams Amendments, supra note 17, at 700-01. As
the Gateway court noted, the legislative history of the Williams Act states that Congress
designed the disclosure requirements for the benefit of investors, while providing the
tender offeror and the stock issuer an equal opportunity to fairly present their positions.
495 F. Supp. at 98; see H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 16, at 2811, 2813. Reasoning that an
action under § 13(d) by a stock issuer would give management a competitive advantage over
takeover groups, the court in Gateway concluded that actions by issuers would destroy the
neutrality the Williams Act sought to achieve between stock issuers and tender offerors.
495 F. Supp. at 101; see note 85 supra. The Second Circuit, the first court to expressly hold
that § 13(d) gives rise to a private cause of action for stock issuers, acknowledged in GAF
Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972) the possibility that
management could abuse a § 13(d) action, but concluded that the courts could adequately
counteract the danger by carefully scrutinizing a stock issuer's § 13(d) allegations. Id. at
719-20; see note 22 supra. The court in Milstein also noted that if management brought an
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06
cluded that section 13(d) did not expressly create or alter civil liability."
The district court noted that section 13(d) was a disclosure statute
similar to section 17(a) of the '34 Act, which the Supreme Court in
Redington held did not give rise to a private cause of action."°7 The court
in Gateway therefore concluded that section 13(d)'s language and purpose did not suggest a private cause of action for a stock issuer."8
The Gateway court found the legislative history silent as to a
private cause of action under section 13(d), and reasoned that this silence
supported the refusal to infer a cause of action under section 13(d)."0 9
Finally, the Gateway court concluded that the statutory scheme of expressed enforcement under the '34 Act weighed heavily against the inference of an additional remedy.' The '34 Act provides for SEC enforcement of section 13(d)."' Purchasers and sellers of stock who detrimentally rely on false or misleading statements in a Schedule 13D may seek

action under § 13(d) motivated by its own interest, rather than in the best interest of the
corporation's shareholders, shareholders could seek redress under the theory of corporate
waste. Id. at 720. Additionally, the requirement that the stock issuer must show irreparable
harm resulting from the § 13(d) violations before a court will grant injunctive relief lessens
the potential for abuse of § 13(d) by a stock issuer. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422
U.S. 49, 50-51 (1975).
" 495 F. Supp. at 99.
107Id.; see text accompanying notes 44-47 supra & 121-22 infra. The court in Gateway
distinguished §§ 13(d) and 17(a) from § 215 of the '40 Act, which the Supreme Court in
Transamericaconcluded gave rise to a private cause of action. 495 F. Supp. at 99; see text
accompanying notes 58-61 supra. The Gateway court reasoned that the language of §§ 13(d)
and 17(a) did not compare with the language of § 215 of the '40 Act, which strongly indicated
Congress' intent to create a private cause of action for contract recission. 495 F. Supp. at 99;
see text accompanying note 61 supra.
a 495 F. Supp. at 99.
Id. The Gateway court noted that in the legislative history the SEC stated that the
Williams Act would add little, if any, to the cost of administering the securities laws. Id. at
99 n.11; see H.R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 16, at 2811, 2817. The district court acknowledged that a court could construe the SEC's position as indicating that private parties would
carry the burden of enforcement rather than the SEC. 495 F. Supp. at 99 n.11. However, the
Gateway court reasoned that the SEC's statement alone, as opposed to a congressional
statement, could not uphold a conclusion that Congress intended private enforcement under
§ 13(d). Id. But see Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 n.27 (1976) (Court declines
to accord deference to SEC view that Court should infer right of action for damages under §
14(e) of '34 Act for defeated tender offerors). See also note 128 infra.
"1 495 F. Supp. at 98. The court in Gateway stated that the detailed enforcement
scheme of the '34 Act indicated that Congress had considered enforcement of the Act. Id.
the district court therefore reasoned that Congress did not "absentmindedly forget" to indicate an intended private right of action for injunctive relief under § 13(d). Id.
"' See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d), (e) (1976). Section 21 of the '34 Act authorizes the SEC to investigate possible violations of the '34 Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(a), (b) (1976). If the SEC concludes that someone violated or is about to violate the '34 Act, the agency may file suit for
an injunction or writ of mandamus. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78d(d), (e)
(1976). Additionally, the Attorney General may institute criminal proceedings for a violation of the '34 Act. See 15
U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976).

986

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVIII

relief under section 18(a).' Section 13(d) contains no language creating a
private remedy, unlike other provisions of the '34 Act."' The Gateway
court therefore concluded that examination of section 13(d)'s language,
legislative history and purpose, and the statutory enforcement scheme
create a private
of the '34 Act, indicated that Congress did not intend to
4
cause of action for stock issuers under section 13(d).1
In Gateway, the court's analysis complies with that prescribed by
the Supreme Court in Redington and Transamerica.The district court
examined section 13(d)'s language, legislative history and purpose, and
the enforcement scheme of the '34 Act, factors the Supreme Court considers most indicative of congressional intent. 5 Moreover, the Gateway
court emphasized the role of congressional intent in determining
whether a court can infer a private cause of action,"' an emphasis which
is consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in Redington and Transamerica."7 Redington and Transamerica also support the Gateway
court's failure to examine the necessity of a private cause of action for
the implementation of section 13(d) or whether such an action is one
traditionally relegated to state law."' The Supreme Court held in both
" See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976); note 20 supra. The court in Gateway noted that in
Redington the Supreme Court, while declining to decide the issue, observed that evidence
exists which supports the view that Congress intend § 18(a) to provide the exclusive remedy
for misstatements contained in reports filed under the '34 Act. 495 F. Supp. at 98; see
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 573-74 (1979); 78 CONG. REC. 2271 (1938)
(remarks of Senator Fletcher); Hearings on S. Res. 84 et al. before the Senate Committee on
Banking & Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, p. 6638 (1934) (remarks of President New
York Stock Exchange).
"' See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78p(b) ('34 Act provisions that expressly provide for private
rights of action).
114 495 F. Supp. at 99. The court in Gateway found additional support for the denial of
an inferred cause of action under § 13(d) in that the injunctive relief which the plaintiff
sought would not remedy the alleged harm from § 13(d) violations. Id. at 99 n.12. The plaintiffs alleged that the continued acquisition of Gateway stock by the defendants would result
in delisting of the corporation. Id. The Court noted, however, that even if the defendants
corrected their Schedule 13D, the defendants could still continue to acquire additional
Gateway stock and delisting might yet occur. Id.
1, See id. at 97; text accompanying notes 66-73 and 99-114 supra. The district court in
Gateway carefully examined the Supreme Court's reasoning in Redington and Transamerica in order to determine the factors which the Supreme Court prescribed as proper
considerations in a case involving an inferred private cause of action. 495 F. Supp. at 96-97.
16 See 495 F. Supp. at 97; text accompanying notes 99, 114 supra.
117 See text accompanying notes 66-73 supra. The Supreme Court's decisions in both
Redington and Transameicaleave no question that Congress' intent as to a private cause
of action under a federal statute is the ultimate consideration in cases involving inferred
causes of action. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979); text accompanying note 67
supra.
11' See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra. The district court in Gateway specifically
declined to consider whether a private cause of action under § 13(d) was necessary to implement the purpose of the section. 495 F. Supp. at 97. The court noted that the Supreme Court
in both Redington and Transamericahad declined to consider the desirability of inferring a
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cases that consideration of the last two Cort factors was not necessary
when a court's examination of the first two Cort factors revealed congressional intent to deny the inference of a private cause of action."'
Although the Gateway court's analysis complies with that prescribed by the Supreme Court, the district court failed to consider several
variables which undermine the conclusion that section 13(d) does not
give rise to a private cause of action. In concluding that section 13(d)
does not expressly create or alter civil liability,12 the Gateway court failed to consider prior courts' interpretation of section 13(d). Courts have
consistently interpreted section 13(d) as imposing a duty on a shareholder to file a complete and truthful Schedule 13D.121 This interpretation distinguishes section 13(d) from section 17(a) which the Supreme
Court in Redington held did not create a duty on the part of an accountant to file complete and accurate financial statements.122 Additionally,
private cause of action. Id. at 97; see text accompanying notes 52-54, 65, 70-71 supra & 119
infra. The Gateway court characterized the desirability of an inferred private cause of action as a factor which only tangentially bears upon the question of congressional intent to
create or deny a private cause of action. 495 F. Supp. at 97.
,, See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979); text accompanying notes 53-54, 65
& 71 supra.
"=495 F. Supp. at 99; see text accompanying notes 106-07 supra.
121 See, e.g., Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1223-24 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3488 (1981); Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240,
248 n.16 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 720 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972), text accompanying note 21 supra. As the district court in
Gateway correctly noted, the inference of a private cause of action under § 13(d) in prior
cases is suspect because these decisions are based on J.I. Case & Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964). The Supreme Court in Redington and Transamerica severely limited the precedential value of Borak. See 495 F. Supp. at 96; text accompanying notes 23-27, 74, 98 supra.
However, the prior courts' interpretation of § 13(d) as requiring the filing of a complete and
truthful statement was not based on the Borak decision. The Second Circuit in Milstein based its conclusion that § 13(d) requires the filing of a complete and truthful Schedule 13D on
the Supreme Court's instruction in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180, 195 (1963) that courts should construe the securities acts flexibly to implement the acts'
purposes. See 453 F.2d at 720. The Milstein court found additional support for the conclusion that § 13(d) mandates complete and accurate filing in § 13(d)(2), which places a continuing obligation on a shareholder to amend the Schedule 13D if there are material changes.
See id., 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d}(2) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The D.C. Circuit accepted the interpretation of § 13(d) as requiring the filing of a complete and truthful Schedule 13D in a case
which involved an action brought by the SEC against a shareholder. SEC v. Savoy Indus.,
Inc., 587 F.2d at 1165; see SEC v. CMC Int'l, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 889, 893 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd
mem., 505 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Evans v. SEC, 420 U.S. 930 (1975)
(reporting provisions of '34 Act are satisfied only by filing of complete, accurate, and timely
reports).
" See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 567, 569-70 (1979). The Second
Circuit in Redington held that § 17(a) imposes a duty on accountants to file complete and accurate financial statements. Id. at 567. On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the lower
court's conclusion and held that § 17(a) simply requires the periodic filing of certain information with the SEC. Id. at 569-70. In Gateway, the plaintiffs asserted an inferred private
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the Gateway court may have unjustifiably relied on the statutory enforcement scheme of the '34 Act as an indication of Congress' intent to
deny a private cause of action under section 13(d). "2I Congress did not
enact section 13(d) as part of the original '34 Act, but rather adopted section 13(d) over 30 years later.'24 During the years between the adoption
of the '34 Act and the Williams Act, the Supreme Court cases indicated
that courts should infer private causes of action under federal statutes
when such actions implemented the purpose of the statute." In fact, the
Supreme Court decided J.. Case & Co. v. Borak only a few years prior to
the adoption of the Williams Act."' Congress was aware of Supreme
Court decisions on inferred causes of action"' and therefore could have
concluded that an expressed private remedy under section 13(d) was not
necessary."8
cause of action for injunctive relief, whereas in Redington, the plaintiff sought damages
under § 17(a). See 495 F. Supp. at 95; 442 U.S. at 562. The difference in the relief sought
under § 13(a) and § 17(a) lessens the relevance of the Redington Court's analysis of § 17(a)
and the Court's conclusion that the section did not give rise to an inferred private cause of
action. The Supreme Court in Redington reasoned that because § 17(a) seeks to forestall insolvency and does not seek to provide recompense after insolvency occurs, the section did
not give rise to a private cause of action for damages. Id. at 570-71. The Redington Court's
finding does not apply directly to an action for injunctive relief because courts grant injunctive relief to deter or correct wrongful conduct, not to compensate an injured party. See
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 61 (1975).
"' See text accompanying notes 110-13 supra.
124 See text accompanying note 15 supra. See also Private Rights, supra note 18, at
592-93.
'
See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
The Supreme Court decided Borak in 1964 and Congress adopted the Williams Act
in 1968. See 337 U.S. 426 (1964); Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 454,
amending 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to kk (1976).
"' During the Senate hearings on the Williams Act, several legal authorities submitted
written statements concerning the inference of private causes of action under similar
statutes. See Full Disclosure of CorporateEquity Ownership in Corporate Takeover Bids:
Hearings on S.510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 67, 140 (1967). The Supreme Court in Piper v. Ch ris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), found the statements concerning inferred causes of action under
statutes similar to the Williams Act unpersuasive evidence that Congress considered the
question of a private damage action because the legal authorities who made the statements
were not subject to cross-examination or comment by the Senate subcommittee. Id. at 31-32.
However, at least one commentator suggested at the time Congress adopted the Williams
Act, that courts would infer private actions under the Act. See Fleischer & Mundheim,
supra note 16, at 362.
" See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 32 n.8 (1979)
(White, J., dissenting); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring); Gateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92, 101 n.15
(N.D. Ill. 1980). The district court in Gateway acknowledged that because the federal courts
had freely inferred private causes of action under federal statutes prior to 1975, the courts
had encouraged Congress to leave the question of a private cause of action under a particular statute to the courts. Id. The Gateway court, however, rejected the plaintiffs contention
that denial of a private cause of action under § 13(d) was unfair because of Congress'
reliance on the federal courts' prior liberal attitude. Id. The district court relied on the
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In spite of the omissions in the Gateway court's analysis, the court's
conclusion that section 13(d) does not give rise to a private cause of action by stock issuers for injunctive relief is correct. The Supreme Court
in Redington and Transamericaindicated that in order to infer a private
cause of action under a particular statute, a court must find strong
evidence that Congress intended to create such an action.129 Although
the omissions in the Gateway court's analysis of section 13(d) render less
persuasive the court's conclusion that Congress did not intend that the
section give rise to a private cause of action, the omissions do not reveal
strong evidence of Congress' intent to create such an action under section 13(d). 30 Moreover, because a stock issuer is not a member of the
class especially benefitted by section 13(d),1' a court could not properly
infer a private cause of action for stock issuers under the section."'
Transamericaanalysis and Congress' ability to amend a statutory scheme to provide for a
private cause of action, to reject the plaintiff's argument. Id.
"'
See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-78 (1979); Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-24 (1979; text accompanying notes 66-73
supra.
'- Arguably, a court may properly consider whether an inferred private cause of action
by a stock issuer is necessary to implement the purpose of § 13(d) and whether such an action is traditionally relegated to state law. These considerations may be appropriate if a
court discerns that § 13(d)'s language, legislative history and purpose, and the '34 Act's enforcement scheme do not clearly indicate congressional intent to create a private cause of
action under the section, or at least do not indicate clear negative intent. See text accompanying notes 70-73 supra. Several lower court decisions suggest that a private action by a
stock issuer is necessary to implement the congressional purpose underlying § 13(d). See
text accompanying notes 20-22 supra & 175-85 infra. Additionally, although corporations are
the creatures of state law and their internal affairs are within the purview of state law,
federal laws generally cover the securities area. See Cort v. Ash, 442 U.S. 66, 85 (1975);
Private Rights, supra, note 18, at 595. See generally Fogelson, supra note 11, at 440-51;
Note, Securities Law and the Constitution:State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88
YALE L.J. 510 (1979). State common law remedies are generally insufficient to compensate
an injured party. See Private Rights, supra note 18, at 595. Where states have passed
statutes regulating large acquisitions of stock, the disclosure requirements fall short of
those required under § 13(d). See id. Moreover, several courts have declared unconstitutional state statutes regulating takeovers. See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577
F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp.,
443 U.S. 173 (1979) (Idaho's takeover statute preempted by Williams Act and invalid under
commerce clause); Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 1-2 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (Delaware
takeover statute preempted by Williams Act and invalid under commerce clause); Fogelson,
supra note 13, at 442-49. Additionally, Congress is presently considering legislation which
would preempt state legislation overlapping the '34 Act. See S.3188, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.,
126 CONG. REC. S.14,059-S.14,006 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1980) [hereinafter cited as S. 3188 and
paginated to CONG. REC.]; Fogelson, supra note 11. at 442-51.
"' See text accompanying notes 101-05 supra.
13 Congress arguably enacted § 13(d) for the benefit of the general public in addition to
the specific group of investors. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (§ 13(d) requirements as necessary in "the public interest or for the protection of investors .. ."); text
accompanying notes 101-05 supra. However, a court should be reluctant to infer a private
cause of action under § 13(d) on the basis that stock issuers are members of the public
without clear evidence that Congress intend to create such an action. See Cort v. Ash, 442
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The court in Sta-Rite Industries, Inc. v. Nortek, Inc.,133 concluded, as
did the Gateway court, that Congress did not intend a private cause of
action for injunctive relief under section 13(d) for a stock issuer."l In StaRite, the plaintiffs, Sta-Rite Industries, Inc. (Sta-Rite), alleged violations
of section 13(d) and, therefore, sought to enjoin the defendant from
continuing to acquire Sta-Rite stock.135 The defendant filed a motion to
dismiss which challenged the plaintiff's standing to seek injunctive relief
under section 13(d).136 Having concluded that a stock issuer could not
bring an action under section 13(d), the district court granted the motion
to dismiss." 7 The court in Sta-Rite reasoned that the recent Supreme
Court decisions in Redington and Transamericarequired a re-examination of prior cases inferring a private cause of action under section
13(d). " ' Relying on the Gateway court's analysis, the court in Sta-Rite
held that Congress did not intend a private remedy under section 13(d).'39
Another district court case, Kirsh Co. v. Bliss & LaughlinIndustries,
Inc.,"' rejected the Gateway court's reliance on Redington and Transamerica and held that stock issuers have a private cause of action for injunctive relief under section 13(d).' In Kirsch, the plaintiff, Kirsch ComU.S. 66, 79 (1975). In Cort, the Court stated that although Congress enacted a statute for the
benefit of the public, rather than a specific group of people, this fact would not automatically preclude the inference of a private cause of action. Id. ; see note 32 supra.The Supreme
Court, however, has been extremely reluctant to infer private causes of action under
statutes benefitting the public at large and has done so on very few occasions. See Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-93 n.13 (1979). Moreover, Congress did not enact
§ 13(d) solely for the benefit of the public, but singled out investors as the specially protected group. See text accompanying notes 93-105 supra. The Supreme Court has never inferred a private cause of action for a plaintiff under a statute which Congress enacted for
the special protection of a particular group where the plaintiff did not come within the
especially benefitted group. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 690-93 n.13.
Indeed, in Transamericathe Supreme Court acknowledged that the plaintiff was a member
of the class especially benefitted by § 206 of the '40 Act, and yet declined to infer a private
cause of action for the plaintiff under that section. See 444 U.S. 11, 17, 20 (1979); text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
"1 494 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
"3 Id. at 362; see text accompanying notes 100-14 supra. The court in Sta-Rite rejected
the conclusion reached in Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 488, 492
(W.D. Mich. 1980), that § 13(d) gives rise to a private cause of action by stock issuers for injunctive relief. 494 F. Supp. at 362; see text accompanying notes 140-49 infra.
" 494 F. Supp. at 358-59. The plaintiff in Stea-Rite alleged that statements contained in
defendant's Schedule 13D were materially false and misleading. Id. at 359.
"' Id.
Id. at 363.
'' Id. at 360. The Sta-Rite court concluded that Redington and Transamericaindicated
a narrowing of the Supreme Court's Borak standard for inferring a private cause of action.
494 F. Supp. at 360. The Sta-Rite court concluded that because earlier cases inferring a
private cause of action under § 13(d) relied on Borak, the holdings in these cases were no
longer applicable. Id. at 360; see text accompanying notes 74, 98 supra.
"3 494 F. Supp. at 361-63; see text accompanying notes 100-14 supra.
495 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
". Id. at 491-92; see text accompanying notes 100-14 supra. The court in Saunders Leasing System, Inc. v. Societe Holding Gray D'Albion S.A. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) I
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pany, brought an action against Bliss & Laughlin Industries, Inc. for injunctive relief against misrepresentations contained in the defendant's
Schedule 13D. 4 The defendants, relying on Gateway, contended that the
plaintiff lacked standing to bring an action under section 13(d)."I The
Kirsch court found the Gateway court's application of Redington and
Transamerica unpersuasive.' First, the court noted that the Supreme
Court cases involved actions for damages rather than for injunctive
Secondly, the Kirsch court concluded that the statutes conrelief.'
in
Redington and Transamerica did not reflect a public interest
sidered
requiring full and truthful disclosure as section 13(d) does.'46 The court in
97,881 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 30, 1981), as did the Dan River and Kirsch courts, inferred a private
cause of action under § 13(d) for stock issuers for injunctive relief. Id. at 90,452. The
Saunders court noted that although the Fifth Circuit had not ruled on a stock issuer's standing to seek injunctive relief under § 13(d), the First, Second, Fourth and Eighth Circuits had
held that a stock issuer could seek injunctive relief under § 13(d). Id. at 90,451-52; see Dan
River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1224 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3488
(1981); Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240, 248 (8th Cir. 1979); General
Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90, 94 n.5 (1st Cir. 1977); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453
F.2d 709, 720 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); text accompanying notes 20,
77-85 supra.Based on what the court characterized as the persuasive authority from other
circuits and the purpose behind § 13(d), the Saunders court held that stock issuers have a
private cause of action for injunctive relief under § 13(d). 97,881, at 90,452. The Saunders
court did not mention either the Gateway or Sta-Rite decisions, nor did the court consider
the Supreme Court's decisions in Redington and Transamerica.See id.
112 495 F. Supp. at 589-90. The plaintiffs in Kirsch sought to enjoin the defendants from
acquiring additional shares of Kirsch stock and from exercising any influence in the
business or management of Kirsch. Id. The complaint also sought to enjoin defendant from
voting any shares of Kirsch stock and from making any public statements relating to
Kirsch. Id. Additionally, the plaintiff requested the court to order the defendant to file an
amended Schedule 13D correcting the alleged misrepresentations and omissions. Id. at 490.
Finally, the plaintiff asked the court to order the divestment of all Kirsch stock which the
defendant controlled. Id.
"I Id. The Kirsch defendant contended that the plaintiff not only lacked standing as a
stock issuer under § 13(d), but also lacked standing to bring an action on behalf of its
shareholders under § 13(d). Id. The defendant in Kirsch did not raise the issue of standing
under § 13(d) until after conclusion of the district court's hearings on plaintiff's motion for
preliminary injunction. Id. at 490 n.2. Defendant transmitted to the court a copy of the
Gateway opinion, decided nine days prior, and a letter asking the court to take the Gateway
opinion into consideration. Plaintiff responded shortly thereafter to the defendant's letter
and the Gateway opinion. Id. Although the defendant did not file a motion to dismiss, the
district court in Kirsch felt compelled to address the issue of standing under § 13(d). Id.
I"Id. at 491. The Kirsch court noted that the Sixth Circuit had not ruled on the inference of a private cause of action under § 13(d) and that its decisions are not controlled by the
decisions of other circuits. Id. at 492.
145Id. at 491. But see text accompanying notes 152-53 infra.
'
495 F. Supp. at 491. The Kirsch court gave no explanation for concluding that the
statutes under review in Redington and Transamericadid not reflect a public interest requiring full and truthful disclosure. See id. But see text accompanying notes 155-59 infra.
The Kirsch court may have been referring to the judicial decisions which held that § 13(d)
required full and accurate disclosure by a shareholder. See text accompanying note 21
supra. The interpretation of § 13(d) as requiring complete and truthful disclosure
distinguishes the section from § 17(a) of the '34 Act which was under review in Redington.
See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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Kirsch chose instead to rely on Dan River and prior judicial decisions inferring a private cause of action under section 13(d) for stock issuers
seeking injunctive relief.'47 The court emphasized the inherent requirement of section 13(d) to file a complete and truthful Schedule 13D.' The
court stated that to deny a stock issuer the right to seek injunctive relief
under section 13(d) would defeat the purpose of section 13(d), as well as
the purpose underlying the '34 Act.149
The district court in Kirsch considered the effect of Redington and
Transamericaon the inference of a private cause of action under section
13(d). ° However, the court's attempt to distinguish the Supreme Court
cases on factual grounds is unpersuasive. Initially, the Kirsch court
stated that Redington and Transamericadid not apply to section 13(d)
because both cases involved actions for damages rather than for injunctive relief.15' Although the Supreme Court declined to infer private
causes of action for damages in both cases,'52 the Court in Transamerica
inferred a private cause of action for injunctive relief."3 The Kirsch
court also contended that neither Redington nor Transamericainvolved
statutes which reflected a public interest requiring full and truthful
disclosure, as section 13(d) does.5 4 The statutes involved in Transamerica are not disclosure statutes like section 13(d),"' but section 17(a)
of the '34 Act, which the Redington Court held did not give rise to a
private cause of action, is a disclosure provision similar to section 13(d)."'
...
495 F. Supp. at 491-92; see text accompanying notes 20, 77-85 supra.
"1 495 F. Supp. at 491-92. The Kirsch court relied primarily on Dan River and earlier
opinions for the proposition that § 13(d) requires not just the filing of a Schedule 13D, but
the full and truthful disclosure of all information required under § 13(d).
"' Id.; see text accompanying notes 21-22 & 89 supra. 495 F. Supp. at 492. The court in
Kirsch found that Congress intended § 13(d) to provide accurate and complete information
from which investors could assess the potential for change in corporate control and adequately estimate the company's worth. Id.; see text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
"' 495 F. Supp. at 490-91; see text accompanying notes 41-73 & 145-46 supra.
151495 F. Supp. at 491; see text accompanying note 145 supra.
"' See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571-74 (1979) (refusing inference
of private cause of action for damages under § 17(a) of '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1976));
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19-22 (1979) (refusing inference
of private cause of action for damages under § 206 of '40 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976)); text
accompanying notes 39-64.
" See 444 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1979) (inferring private cause of action for contract recission
and injunctive relief under § 215 of '40 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976)); text accompanying
notes 58, 60-61 supra.
"3 495 F. Supp. at 491; see text accompanying note 146 supra.
"3 See 444 U.S. 11, 16-17 (1979); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15 (1976) (§ 215 of '40 Act voiding any
contract whose formation or performance would violate '40 Act); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976) (§
206 of '40 Act prohibiting fraudulent practices by investment advisors); text accompanying
notes 59-64 supra.
" See 442 U.S. 560, 569-71 (1979); 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1976). Section 17(a) requires the
security exchanges and the exchanges' members to make and keep accounts, correspondence and other records which the SEC prescribes. Id. Rule 17a-5 requires brokerage
firms to file with the SEC annual financial reports which are certified by public accountants.
17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1980); see text accompanying note 41 supra.
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Although the Redington court concluded that section 17(a) is essentially
a bookkeeping provision,157 the Court also indicated that the investment
community had an interest in full and truthful disclosure under section
17(a).1 8 The Supreme Court, however, held that the interest in full and
truthful disclosure under section 17(a) did not warrant an inferred
private cause of action. 59
Even if the Kirsch court's distinction of Redington and Transamerica on factual grounds were correct, the analysis employed by the
Supreme Court in both cases is applicable to any case involving the inference of a private cause of action under a federal statute.' 5 In both
Redington and Transamerica,the Supreme Court stated that a court
should consider only congressional intent to create or deny a cause of action."' The court further indicated that a statute's language, legislative
history and purpose, and enforcement scheme are the most accurate indicia of congressional intent concerning a private cause of action under
the particular statute.'82 In Kirsch, the district court did not examine section 13(d)'s language, legislative history and purpose, or the enforcement
scheme of the '34 Act. Moreover, the Kirsch court did not ascertain
whether Congress intended that section 13(d) give rise to a private cause
of action for stock issuers. Rather, the district court emphasized the
necessity of a private action under section 13(d) to implement the sec6 3
tion's purpose."
Although private enforcement of section 13(d) may be
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the section, this justification
alone is inadequate." 4 Because the Kirsch court failed to examine congressional intent as prescribed by Redington and Transamerica, the
district court's conclusion that stock issuers may seek injunctive relief
16
under section 13(d) is not convincing.'
The split in the federal court decisions concerning section 13(d)
demonstrates that courts have difficulty resolving the conflict between
the desire to provide remedies necessary to implement the purpose of
442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979); see text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
" See 442 U.S. 560, 569-71 (1979). Congress intended the information contained in §
17(a) reports to provide the SEC and other authorities with sufficient early warning to allow
the authorities to take appropriate action to protect investors before the financial collapse
of a brokerage firm. See id. at 570. Accurate and complete § 17(a) reports are essential if the
SEC and other authorities are to adequately protect investors. See id. at 569-71.
"' Id. at 570-72; see text accompanying notes 43-51 supra.
See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
"' See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979); text accompanying notes 66-67
supra.
' See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 16-24 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-76 (1979); text accompanying notes 68-73
supra.
" 495 F. Supp. at 491-92; see text accompanying notes 148-49 supra.
11 See text accompanying notes 66-73 supra; text accompanying notes 175-85 infra.
" See text accompanying note 7 supra.
T
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section 13(d).6 and the desire not to legislate through judicial decisions."'
The Supreme Court's restrictive view of the inference of private causes
of action reflects the Court's recognition of the separation of powers doctrine.'68 The Constitution of the United States vests Congress with the
power to legislate," 9 whereas the judiciary is vested with the power to
interpret the laws which Congress adopts. ° The separation of powers
doctrine mandates that the duties and powers of Congress and the
judiciary remain separate.' Consequently, the inference of a private
cause of action under a federal statute is proper when a court is interpreting congressional intent to create such an action."' However, if a
" See Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1222-24 (1980), cert. denied, 49
U.S.L.W. 3488 (1981); Saunders Leasing System, Inc. v. Societe Holding Gray D'Albion S.A.
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) J 97,881, 90,452 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 30, 1981); Kirsch Co. v.
Bliss & Laughlin Indus., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 488, 491-92 (W.D. Mich. 1980); text accompanying
notes 21-22, 77-85 & 140-49 supra.
117 See Sta-Rite Indus., Inc. v. Nortek, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 358,
361-63 (E.D. Wis. 1980);
Gateway Indus., Inc. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92, 97-99 (E.D. Ill. 1980);
Forkosch, The Separation of Powers, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 529, 532-36 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Forkosch]; text accompanying notes 93-124 & 132-39 supra.
" In Redington the Supreme Court expressly recognized that the federal courts were
not at liberty to legislate. 442 U.S. at 579. The Court stated that if there was to be a private
cause of action for damages under § 17(a) of the '34 Act, Congress must provide it. Id.; see
also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963) (not for courts to legislate).
189See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
1 See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). See generally A. BRICKEL, THE

1-14 (1962) [hereinafter cited as BRICKEL]; Wechsler, The Courts
and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1004-08 (1965).
"' See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-31 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978); BRICKEL, supra note 170, at 46-48; Forkosch,
supra note 167, at 529-32. Article III of the Constitution vests only Congress with the
responsibility for determining the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. See U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 1. However, when a court infers a private cause of action under a federal statute
when Congress did not intend such an action to exist, a court is expanding its own jurisdiction. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 730-31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
1 See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979);
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568, 579 (1979); Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 577, 730-31 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); Forkosch, supra note 167, at
532-36; Note, The Phenomenon of Implied Private Action of Federal Statutes: JudicialInsight, Legislative Oversight or Legislation by the Judiciary?, 43 FORD. L. REV. 441, 456
n.110 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The Phenomenon]; text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
"' See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579 (1979); Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-31 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). Forkosch, supra note 167, at
532-36; The Phenomenon, supra note 172, at 456 n.110. Justice Powell in his dissenting opinion in Cannon vigorously criticized the four-pronged test which the Court provided in Cort
to determine if a particular statute gave rise to a private cause of action. Id. at 739-49.
Justice Powell stated that courts can too easily use the Cort test to deflect inquiry away
from the intent of Congress and instead, substitute the court's own view as to the desirability of private enforcement. Id. at 740. Only the second Cort factor, whether legislative intent, explicit or implicit, exists to create or deny a private cause of action, passed scrutiny
under Justice Powell's examination. See id. Justice Powell stated that the other factors invited judicial legislation. Id. Justice Powell concurred in the Transamericaopinion solely on
the basis that he considered the majority opinion to reflect his dissenting opinion in Cannon.
See 444 U.S. 11, 25 (Powell, J., concurring).
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
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court infers a private cause of action under a federal statute solely on
the grounds that such an action is necessary to implement the statute's
purpose, the court is not interpreting a statute, but is legislating."'
As the Gateway and Sta-Rite decisions indicate, under the Supreme
Court's prescribed analysis in Redington and Transamerica a court
should not infer a private cause of action under section 13(d) for a stock
issuer.'74 The denial of an inferred private cause of action for stock
issuers under section 13(d), however, could frustrate the enforcement of
7
the section and hence the section's underlying purpose."
This potential
frustration of the purpose underlying section 13(d) led the courts in Dan
River and Kirsch to infer a private cause of action under section 13(d) for
stock issuers seeking injunctive relief. Both courts concluded that an inferred private cause of action for a stock issuer under section 13(d) was
17
necessary to properly enforce the section. 1
An examination of the current enforcement of section 13(d) supports
the Dan River and Kirsch conclusions. The '34 Act authorizes purchasers and sellers of securities who detrimentally rely on false or
misleading statements contained in a Schedule 13D, to seek relief under
section 18(a).117 However, the denial of a private cause of action under
section 13(d) would result in an anomoly in the private enforcement of
the section, because there is no comparable relief for private parties in
the case of total failure to file a Schedule 13D. 78 The numerous filings required under the securities laws overburden the SEC and, therefore, the
agency cannot adequately police Schedule 13D filings. 79 Stock issuers
"' See Sta-Rite Indus., Inc. v. Nortek, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 358, 360-63 (E.D. Wis. 1980);
Gateway Indus., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92, 97-99 (N.D. Ill. 1980); text accompanying notes 91-117
& 131-37 supra.
1 See text accompanying notes 17-18 infra.
176See Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1222-24 (4th Cir. 1980), cert
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3488 (1981); Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., Inc., 495 F. Supp.
488, 491-92 (W.D. Mich. 1980); text accompanying notes 90, 149 supra. See also Saunders
Leasing System, Inc. v. Societe Holding Gray D'Albion S.A., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,881, 90,452 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 30, 1981); text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
17 See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976); text accompanying notes 49 & 112 supra.
'
See Private Rights, supra note 18, at 592-93. Section 18(a) relief is limited to purchasers and sellers of securities and consequently a stock issuer, or a shareholder who did
not buy or sell securities in reliance on misstatements contained in a Schedule 13D, cannot
bring an action under § 18(a). See 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1979); text accompanying note 177
supra.Moreover, courts have interpreted § 18(a) as only providing an action for damages,
and therefore, § 18(a) does not give rise to a cause of action for injunctive relief. See StaRite Indus., Inc. v. Nortek, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 359, 362 n.1 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Gateway Indus.,
Inc. v. Agency Rent-a-Car, 495 F. Supp. 92, 100 n.13 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
67' See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 721 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972);
Private Rights, supra note 20, at 593-95. Under the '34 Act, each corporation must file a
large and growing number of forms. For example, in 1969 251 Schedule 13D's were filed
with the SEC, in addition to 70 Schedule 14D filings. In 1976 these figures had risen to 1,077
and 107 respectively. Amicus Curiae Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission at 96
n.260, Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). In Piper,the SEC acknowledged that
because of the complexities and speed of tender offers, government agencies, including the
SEC, cannot discover and react to tender offers prior to completion. Id. at 97-98. Addition-
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are a more appropriate party for enforcement of section 13(d)- requirements than either the SEC or shareholders. The SEC is less familiar with day-to-day facts surrounding the filing of a Schedule 13D than a
stock issuer. 8 ' Similarly, stockholders generally have less knowledge of
the background in a Schedule 13D than stock issuers.' Section 13(d) requires a stockholder to send a copy of the Schedule 13D to the issuer,"'
who is likely to scrutinize the schedule because it indicates at least a five
percent shift in corporate control.'83 The stock issuer, therefore, is more
aware of the circumstances and has a definite interest in assuring that a
particular Schedule 13D is complete and truthful."'
Although an inferred private cause of action by a stock issuer for injunctive relief is necessary to properly enforce section 13(d), 85 the
Supreme Court's restrictive view toward the inference of such actions
represents the court's judgment that Congress is the appropriate forum
for creating private actions. 88 Because of the need for private enforcement of section 13(d), Congress is presently considering legislation
which would amend the '34 Act to provide for an expressed private
cause of action by stock issuers for violations of section 13(d).'87 The SEC
fully supports this legislation and indeed drafted the original proposal.'88
ally the SEC has submitted legislation to Congress which would amend the '34 Act to provide expressly for private enforcement by stock issuers. See text accompanying notes
187-88 infra; see also J.I. Case & Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
"' See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 721 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910
(1972).
"'

See id.

"8

See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979); text accompanying notes 10-14

supra.
"I

See GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 721 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910

(1972).

184See id.

See text accompanying notes 177-84 supra.
See text accompanying notes 168-73 supra.
" See S.3188, supra note 130, at S.14,061-62, S.14,065. The proposed amendments to
the Williams Act will modify § 13(d), but the basic application and requirements will not
change. See id. at S.14,059-14,060; Fogelson, supra note 11, at 422-26. Proposed § 14(i)(1) provides for an express private cause of action in favor of a stock issuer, as well as a tendering
or non-tendering shareholder, and a bidder or competing bidder in a tender offer, for violations of the proposed §§ 13(d), (e), or §§ 14(d), (e), (f), (g) or (h). See S. 3188, supra note 130, at
S.14,061-S.14,062. The section-by-section analysis accompanying the proposed amendments
states that stock issuers are secondary beneficiaries of the Williams Act and therefore Congress enacted the Act not only for the benefit of investors, but also for the protection of
stock issuers. See id. at S. 14,065. Furthermore, stock issuers and tender offerors are often
in a better position than the SEC to enforce the '34 Act's provisions. See id. The section-bysection analysis concluded, therefore, that a private cause of action by stock issuers will aid
in carrying out the congressional policies underlying the Williams Act. Id. The section-bysection analysis also stated that Congress intended private causes of action under the
Williams Act as originally adopted. Id. Therefore, the analysis concluded that the Supreme
Court misinterpreted congressional intent in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977),
when the Court denied an inferred cause of action under § 14(e). S.3188, at S.14,065.
I" See S.3188, supra note 130, at S.14,061-62.
"

"'
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However, until Congress adopts the proposed amendments to the '34
Act, the courts should not infer a private cause of action under section
13(d). The denial of such an action in Gateway and Sta-Rite gives effect
to the Supreme Court's restrictive view towards the inference of private
causes of action under federal statutes.'89 Because Gateway and Sta-Rite
probably represent the trend of future court decisions,"' a stock issuer
has little chance of maintaining an action under section 13(d) in the
federal courts. 9 '
CAROLINE WANNAMAKER

' See Sta-Rite Indus., Inc. v. Nortek, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 358, 360-63 (E.D. Wis. 1980);
Gateway Indus., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 92, 97-99 (D.N. Ill. 1980); text accompanying notes 93-119
& 133-39 supra.
1" But see Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1222-24 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3488 (1981); Saunders Leasing System, Inc. v. Societe Gray D'Albion
S.A. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,881, 90,451-52 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 30, 1981); Kirsch
Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Induis., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 488, 490-92 (W.D. Mich. 1980); text accompanying notes 78-86 & 140-49 supra. See also California v. Sierra Club, 49 U.S.L.W. 4441
(April 28, 1981) (no inferred private cause of action under Rivers and Harbors Appropriation
Act of 1899); note 191 infra.
,'9 Even after the Gateway and Sta-Rite decisions, courts have continued to infer a
private cause of action under § 13(d) because of the decisions prior to Gateway, such as Milstein and DanRiver. See, e.g., Saunders Leasing System, Inc. v. Societe Holding Gray D'Albion S.A., [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,881, 90,451-52 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 30, 1981);
Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 488, 490-92 (W.D. Mich. 1980); text
accompanying notes 140-49 supra. Saunders and Kirsch, as well as Dan River, illustrate
that courts are reluctant to deny an inferred private cause of action for stock issuers under
§ 13(d) because courts have allowed such an action almost since Congress adopted the
Williams Act. See text accompanying notes 15, 20-22 supra. See also Rich v. NYSE, [1981]
595 SEc. REG. & L. REP. A-13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1981) (inferred-private cause of action under
§ 6(b) of '34 Act because of 40 year precedent). The Supreme Court has inferred a private
cause of action because of a 25 year precedent in the lower courts. See Superintendent of
Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (inferring private cause of action
under SEC Rule 10b-5). See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975). Additionally, although the
Supreme Court did not directly address the issue, the Court recognized that the plaintiff in
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) was asserting an inferred private cause
of action under § 13(d). Id. at 62; see note 19 supra.

